tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-74682300046363177622024-03-13T10:23:02.029-07:00wishy-washyblogMaestroGustavohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00878250342135981894noreply@blogger.comBlogger1169125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7468230004636317762.post-2101846541537226432017-06-14T23:30:00.003-07:002017-06-14T23:30:36.479-07:00Call for Papers Younger Scholars Forum in Comparative Law XXth International Congress 2018 International Academy of Comparative Law Fukuoka, Japan July 25, 2018<br />
<div style="text-align: center;">
<span style="text-align: justify;"><b>Call for Papers</b></span></div>
<b><span style="text-align: justify;"><div style="text-align: center;">
Younger Scholars Forum in Comparative Law</div>
</span><span style="text-align: justify;"><div style="text-align: center;">
XXth International Congress 2018</div>
</span><span style="text-align: justify;"><div style="text-align: center;">
International Academy of Comparative Law</div>
</span><span style="text-align: justify;"><div style="text-align: center;">
Fukuoka, Japan</div>
</span><span style="text-align: justify;"><div style="text-align: center;">
July 25, 2018</div>
</span></b><span style="text-align: justify;">We invite younger scholars to participate in the first-ever Younger Scholars Forum in</span><br /><span style="text-align: justify;">Comparative Law, to be held in Fukuoka, Japan on Wednesday, July 25, 2018, from 9:00am to</span><br /><span style="text-align: justify;">12:00pm as part of the larger quadrennial Congress of Comparative Law organized by the</span><br /><span style="text-align: justify;">International Academy of Comparative Law (IACL).</span><br /><span style="text-align: justify;">Abstracts are invited for eight (8) Workshops and one (1) TED-style Speakers’ Corner. All</span><br /><span style="text-align: justify;">nine sessions will be held concurrently from 9:00am to 12:00pm on the day of the Forum. More</span><br /><span style="text-align: justify;">details follow below on the subject-matter of each Workshop and on the format of the Speakers’</span><br /><span style="text-align: justify;">Corner.</span><br /><span style="text-align: justify;">Abstracts may be submitted in either English or French, the two official languages of the</span><br /><span style="text-align: justify;">IACL.</span><br /><span style="text-align: justify;">The Congress</span><br /><span style="text-align: justify;">The IACL hosts a general Congress of Comparative Law every four years. It is the premiere</span><br /><span style="text-align: justify;">gathering for scholars of comparative law. It is a “general” Congress because scholars of all fields</span><br /><span style="text-align: justify;">attend and participate in Workshops on specific subjects that span the broad range of private and</span><br /><span style="text-align: justify;">public law. To learn more about the IACL, here is its website: http://iuscomparatum.info. And here</span><br /><span style="text-align: justify;">is a description of the IACL itself: http://iuscomparatum.info/general-presentation.</span><br /><span style="text-align: justify;">The Younger Scholars Forum in Comparative Law</span><br /><span style="text-align: justify;">For the first time in its history (the first general Congress was held at The Hague in 1932), the</span><br /><span style="text-align: justify;">IACL will host a program for younger scholars, defined as those scholars with no more than</span><br /><span style="text-align: justify;">ten years of tenure-track faculty experience. This includes graduate students as well as postdoctoral</span><br /><span style="text-align: justify;">fellows, lecturers and visiting affiliates who have yet to secure a continuing faculty</span><br /><span style="text-align: justify;">appointment.</span><br /><span style="text-align: justify;">The Younger Scholars Forum in Comparative Law is chaired and convened by Richard Albert</span><br /><span style="text-align: justify;">(Canada/USA) along with vice-chairs Luisa Fernanda García López (Colombia) and Maxime StHilaire</span><br /><span style="text-align: justify;">(Canada). The chair is supported by a Program Committee and a Senior Advisory</span><br /><span style="text-align: justify;">Committee. Members of both committees are identified further down below. The Program</span><br /><span style="text-align: justify;">Committee is composed of three subcommittees: the Planning & Priorities subcommittee, cochaired</span><br /><span style="text-align: justify;">by Cora Chan (China) and Yaniv Roznai (Israel); the Information & Recruitment</span><br /><span style="text-align: justify;">subcommittee, co-chaired by Cristina Fasone (Italy) and Daniel Wunder Hachem (Brazil); and the</span><br /><span style="text-align: justify;">Communications & Technology subcommittee, chaired by John Haskell (United Kingdom). </span><br /><span style="text-align: justify;">[2]</span><br /><span style="text-align: justify;">Workshops</span><br /><span style="text-align: justify;">Each Workshop will be conducted as a discussion group structured around accepted papers. Each</span><br /><span style="text-align: justify;">Workshop will feature two Moderators and a Distinguished Provocateur-Discussant. The</span><br /><span style="text-align: justify;">moderators will select up to 25 participants for a wide-ranging discussion that will run for the</span><br /><span style="text-align: justify;">duration of the three-hour session. The Distinguished Provocateur-Discussant will comment on</span><br /><span style="text-align: justify;">remarks made by participants, draw connections among the points made by the participants, seed</span><br /><span style="text-align: justify;">the discussion with new points and questions, as well as challenge, reinforce and/or complicate the</span><br /><span style="text-align: justify;">comments made by the participants. Discussions will be conducted in both English and French.</span><br /><span style="text-align: justify;">Each of the Workshops follows below with an abstract identifying the Moderators and</span><br /><span style="text-align: justify;">Distinguished Provocateur-Discussants.</span><br /><span style="text-align: justify;">Speakers’ Corner</span><br /><span style="text-align: justify;">The Speakers’ Corner will feature 15 to 18 TED-style 9-minute oral presentations on a scholarly</span><br /><span style="text-align: justify;">subject related to a topic of the speaker’s choice in comparative law. All presentations will be</span><br /><span style="text-align: justify;">recorded live in front of an audience at the Forum and uploaded on YouTube for larger</span><br /><span style="text-align: justify;">dissemination with the global community of comparative law.</span><br /><span style="text-align: justify;">How to Participate</span><br /><span style="text-align: justify;">By September 15, 2017, younger scholars should email an abstract between 150 and 500 words</span><br /><span style="text-align: justify;">to the Corresponding Moderator of the Workshop in which they would like to participate. All</span><br /><span style="text-align: justify;">Corresponding Moderators are identified below in connection with each Workshop. For those</span><br /><span style="text-align: justify;">interested in participating in the Speakers’ Corner, younger scholars should email an abstract</span><br /><span style="text-align: justify;">between 150 and 500 words to the Director of the Speakers’ Corner, also identified further below.</span><br /><span style="text-align: justify;">Applicants will be notified by October 15, 2017.</span><br /><span style="text-align: justify;">The IACL does not cover expenses for any participant, including Moderators and Distinguished</span><br /><span style="text-align: justify;">Provocateur-Discussants. But we believe that applicants’ home institutions will support</span><br /><span style="text-align: justify;">participation in this event given the prestige and history of the IACL along with the special</span><br /><span style="text-align: justify;">opportunity to exchange ideas and interact with younger scholars, Moderators and Distinguished</span><br /><span style="text-align: justify;">Provocateur-Discussants from around the world.</span><br /><span style="text-align: justify;">All successful participants will have to register with the IACL. No other affiliation is required to</span><br /><span style="text-align: justify;">participate in this program.</span><br /><span style="text-align: justify;">Questions</span><br /><span style="text-align: justify;">For questions about the Workshops, please contact Program Committee vice-chairs Luisa</span><br /><span style="text-align: justify;">Fernanda García López (Colombia) at luisa.garcia@urosario.edu.co or Maxime St-Hilaire</span><br /><span style="text-align: justify;">(Canada) at Maxime.St-Hilaire@usherbrooke.ca.</span><br /><span style="text-align: justify;">For questions about the Speakers’ Corner, please contact the Director John Haskell (United</span><br /><span style="text-align: justify;">Kingdom) at johndhaskell@gmail.com. </span><br /><span style="text-align: justify;">[3]</span><br /><span style="text-align: justify;">For questions about the IACL, please contact Program Committee Chair Richard Albert at</span><br /><span style="text-align: justify;">Richard.Albert@bc.edu. </span><br />
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MaestroGustavohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00878250342135981894noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7468230004636317762.post-41345887400499666282017-03-29T08:05:00.000-07:002017-03-29T08:05:03.950-07:00<div style="text-align: center;">
<b>Northern Ireland and ‘Brexit’: The European Economic Area Option</b></div>
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Brian Doherty</div>
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Independent</div>
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John Temple Lang</div>
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University of Dublin - Trinity College; Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP</div>
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Christopher McCrudden</div>
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Queen's University Belfast - School of Law; University of Michigan Law School</div>
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Lee McGowan</div>
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Queen's University Belfast - Department of Politics and International Studies</div>
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David Phinnemore</div>
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Queen's University Belfast</div>
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Dagmar Schiek</div>
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Queen's University Belfast - School of Law, Centre of European and Transnational Legal Studies</div>
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Date Written: March 15, 2017<br />
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Abstract<br />
UK withdrawal from the EU poses many challenges for Northern Ireland. The preferred option of Northern Ireland's First Minister and deputy First Minister is, in many respects, for the status quo to be maintained. An approach that could mitigate some of the impact of Brexit on Northern Ireland and maintain much of the economic status quo is for Northern Ireland to become a member of the European Economic Area (EEA). This paper sets out what the EEA offers and highlights how EEA membership might be achieved as well as the issues it raises. In the EEA, Northern Ireland would retain full access to the Single Market. It would continue to be part of a European market with the free movement of goods, services, capital and people. EEA membership would also permit some citizenship rights to be maintained. It would not be a panacea, however. It would also bring with it political and legal challenges. But it is a known arrangement and would therefore ensure a significant degree of certainty.<br />
<br />
Keywords: Brexit, Northern Ireland, European Economic Area, EEA<br />
<br />
Full text available at: <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2933715">https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2933715</a>MaestroGustavohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00878250342135981894noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7468230004636317762.post-31284216605966073402017-03-26T23:27:00.004-07:002017-03-26T23:27:32.706-07:00Shany: All Roads Lead to Strasbourg?: Application of the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine by the European Court of Human Rights and the UN Human Rights Committee<div style="text-align: center;">
<b>All Roads Lead to Strasbourg?: Application of the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine by the European Court of Human Rights and the UN Human Rights Committee</b></div>
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<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<b>Yuval Shany</b></div>
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Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Faculty of Law and Institute of Criminology; Israel Democracy Institute</div>
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<div style="text-align: center;">
January 1, 2017</div>
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Abstract</div>
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The present article seeks to explore the possibility that a gap exists between the perceived rejection of the margin of appreciation (MoA) doctrine by the UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), and its actual practice of employing substitute, MoA-like approaches. The existence of such a gap might be explained by the proposition that some aspects of the MoA doctrine are an indispensable element of international adjudication involving state conduct. It may also suggest that there are policy considerations which lead some international human rights bodies not to embrace explicitly the MoA doctrine or to downplay in their jurisprudence the prominence of similar deference-granting doctrines. </div>
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Part One of the article surveys the application of the MoA doctrine in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), identifying three analytically separate prongs – application of law to facts, balancing of norms in the course of law-application and balancing of norms in the course of law interpretation. Part Two then moves to discuss analogous legal moves taken by the HRC, while noting the remaining differences between the approaches of the two bodies. Part Three concludes.</div>
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Keywords: International human rights law, margin of appreciation, European Court of Human Rights, Human Rights Committee, judicial Deference, Treaty, Interpretation, International Courts</div>
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Full text available at: <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2925652">https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2925652</a></div>
MaestroGustavohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00878250342135981894noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7468230004636317762.post-361072673306547952017-03-26T23:22:00.003-07:002017-03-26T23:22:28.330-07:00Territorial Disputes in the Context of Secessionist Conflicts M. Kohen & M. Hebie (eds), Research Handbook on Territorial Disputes in International Law, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2017<div style="text-align: center;">
<b>Territorial Disputes in the Context of Secessionist Conflicts</b></div>
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<b>M. Kohen & M. Hebie (eds), Research Handbook on Territorial Disputes in International Law, </b>Edward Elgar Publishing, 2017</div>
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<div style="text-align: center;">
Theodore Christakis</div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
University Grenoble-Alpes, CESICE, France; Institut Universitaire de France</div>
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<div style="text-align: center;">
Aristoteles Constantinides</div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
University of Cyprus</div>
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<div style="text-align: center;">
Date Written: June 5, 2016</div>
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Abstract</div>
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In this chapter, we explore the territorial dimension of non-decolonization secessionist conflicts in international law. Our investigation is divided in three parts. The first part focuses on secessions resulting from violations of jus cogens norms. We conclude that contemporary international law prohibits such secessions and prescribes non-recognition as the legal consequence. In the second part, we explore the legal framework under general international law relating to unilateral secessions that do not involve violations of jus cogens. We conclude that even though international law neither authorizes nor outright prohibits unilateral secession it sets many obstacles and presumptions against its ultimate success, but ultimately leaves some space for the principle of effectiveness in exceptional cases. Our third part investigates consensual agreements in the context of secessionist conflicts, which have either led to the creation of new states or accommodated the self-determination aspirations of separatist entities within parent states based on territorial self-governance arrangements. This part also highlights the interplay between consent, effectivités and uti possidetis in state practice and also gives a close look to three arbitrations that dealt with territorial disputes in various non/post-colonial contexts.</div>
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Keywords: secession, self-determination, territorial disputes, effectiveness, jus cogens, recognition, non-recognition, uti possidetis, consent, territorial self-government, autonomy</div>
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Full text available at: <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2927644">https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2927644</a></div>
MaestroGustavohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00878250342135981894noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7468230004636317762.post-7051119023108728332017-03-06T02:18:00.000-08:002017-03-06T02:18:15.830-08:00Cristina Fasone The influence of standing committees on the forms of government The case of France, Italy and the UKCristina Fasone<br />
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<i><br /></i>
<i>The influence of standing committees on the forms of government. The case of France, Italy and the UK</i>, Diritticomparati, la Rivista:<br />
<br />
available at: <a href="http://diritto.typepad.com/files/diritticomparati_workingpapers4-2017.pdf">http://diritto.typepad.com/files/diritticomparati_workingpapers4-2017.pdf</a>MaestroGustavohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00878250342135981894noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7468230004636317762.post-14181233585471377552017-02-14T03:00:00.002-08:002017-02-14T03:00:29.879-08:00May 24th, 2017 Scuola superiore "Sant'Anna", Pisa Symposium on the Constitution of Canada: History, Evolution, Influence and Reform<div style="text-align: center;">
May 24th, 2017</div>
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Scuola superiore "Sant'Anna", Pisa</div>
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<b>Symposium on the Constitution of Canada: History, Evolution, Influence and Reform</b></div>
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Full program: <a href="http://stals.sssup.it/files/Canada%20STALS.pdf">http://stals.sssup.it/files/Canada%20STALS.pdf</a></div>
MaestroGustavohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00878250342135981894noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7468230004636317762.post-47872447470984267012017-02-10T06:49:00.003-08:002017-02-10T06:49:23.915-08:00<div style="text-align: center;">
<b>Imposed Constitutions with Consent?</b></div>
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<b>Richard Albert </b></div>
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Boston College - Law School; Yale University - Law School; Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Derecho; University of Toronto - Faculty of Law; Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) Herzliyah - Radzyner School of Law</div>
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February 3, 2017</div>
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Boston College Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No. 434 </div>
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Abstract: </div>
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Can a constitution be imposed with the consent of the peoples on which it is imposed? The conventional understanding of an imposed constitution — a constitution forced upon a people after war or conquest — rejects this possibility because the very nature of an imposed constitution denies that a community of peoples could divest itself of the power of self-determination associated with democratic constitution-making and -changing. Yet beyond contexts of war and conquest, we may consider constitutions to have been imposed also if they reflect some measure of heteronomy. Heteronomous constitutions are created, governed or adapted directly or indirectly by an external actor. This understanding of an imposed constitution accommodates both the conventional view of a constitution written or administered coercively by a victorious power for a vanquished state after war or conquest as well as those domestic constitutions born not of defeat but controlled in some way by an external actor exercising constitution-level decisionmaking authority. In this paper, I identify three categories of heteronomous constitutions imposed with consent — constitutions that are amended, adjudicated and interpreted by others — none quite the paradigmatic model of an indigenous constitution born of and governed by local actors but each one more a function of self-determined choice than a constitution imposed in war or conquest. Recognizing that a constitution can indeed be imposed with consent complicates our understanding of imposed constitutions and forces us to confront the reality that extraterritorial actors can sometimes be invited to occupy a central place in domestic constitutional law.</div>
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Keywords: Imposed Constitutions, Heteronomy, Japanese Constitution, Canadian Constitution, Commonwealth Caribbean, South African Constitution, Grenadian Constitution, Caribbean Court of Justice, Constitutional Amendment, Constitution-Making, Patriation, Colonialism, Global Constitutionalism</div>
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Full paper available at: <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2911180">https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2911180</a></div>
MaestroGustavohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00878250342135981894noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7468230004636317762.post-18474834394074334952017-02-10T06:38:00.002-08:002017-02-10T06:38:37.487-08:002 March, 2017 "Counter-terrorism: An Exchange of Ideas and Practices Between China and the EU", Scuola superiore "Sant'Anna", Pisa <div style="text-align: center;">
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Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna, Pisa</div>
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2 March 2017</div>
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<b>Counter-terrorism: An Exchange of Ideas and Practices</b></div>
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<b>Between China and the EU</b></div>
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Full programme <a href="http://stals.sssup.it/files/Confucius%20Draft%20Prog.pdf">here</a></div>
MaestroGustavohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00878250342135981894noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7468230004636317762.post-41767830865359001892017-02-10T05:59:00.001-08:002017-02-10T05:59:07.690-08:0015 February 2017, "Is EU Administrative Law Failing in Some of Its Crucial Tasks?", Scuola Sant'Anna, Pisa<div style="text-align: center;">
STALS (Sant’Anna Legal Studies) seminars</div>
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<a href="http://www.stals.sssup.it/">www.stals.sssup.it</a></div>
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Within the Jean Monnet Module</div>
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“Eur. Publ. ius- European Public Law-ius”</div>
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(Scuola Sant’Anna, Pisa)</div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
15 February 2017</div>
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<div style="text-align: center;">
Edoardo Chiti</div>
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(Università della Tuscia)</div>
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<b>Is EU Administrative Law Failing in Some of Its</b></div>
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<b>Crucial Tasks?</b></div>
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<u>Discussants</u></div>
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Marta Simoncini</div>
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(University of Antwerp- King’s College, London)</div>
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Emiliano Frediani</div>
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(Scuola Sant’Anna, Pisa)</div>
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Giuseppe Martinico</div>
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(Scuola Sant’Anna, Pisa)</div>
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15 February 2017</div>
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Full programme <a href="http://stals.sssup.it/files/Chiti.pdf">here</a></div>
MaestroGustavohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00878250342135981894noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7468230004636317762.post-41103403767366955362017-02-10T05:57:00.002-08:002017-02-10T05:57:16.739-08:0024 January 2017 (time: 11.00-13.00), "The application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights to national measures", Scuola Sant'Anna, Pisa<div style="text-align: center;">
STALS (Sant’Anna Legal Studies) seminars</div>
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<a href="http://www.stals.sssup.it/">www.stals.sssup.it</a></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
Within the Jean Monnet Module</div>
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“Eur. Publ. ius- European Public Law-ius”</div>
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<div style="text-align: center;">
Filippo Fontanelli</div>
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(University of Edinburgh)</div>
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<b>The application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights to national measures</b></div>
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Full programme<a href="http://stals.sssup.it/files/fontanelli_0.pdf"> here</a></div>
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MaestroGustavohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00878250342135981894noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7468230004636317762.post-63007298508851366772017-02-10T05:55:00.002-08:002017-02-10T05:55:09.023-08:0011 April 2017, 11.00-16.30, "Constitutional Homogeneity and Rule of Law in the European Union: An Interdisciplinary Dialogue"<br />
<div style="text-align: center;">
STALS (Sant’Anna Legal Studies) seminars</div>
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<a href="http://www.stals.sssup.it/">www.stals.sssup.it</a></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
Within the Jean Monnet Modules</div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
“Eur. Publ. ius- European Public Law-ius” and “The EU’s Responses to the</div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
</div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
Challenges of its Neighborhood”</div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<b><br /></b></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<b><br /></b></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<b>Constitutional Homogeneity and Rule of Law in the European Union: An Interdisciplinary Dialogue</b></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
11 April 2017, 11.00-16.30</div>
<div>
Scuola Sant'Anna, Pisa</div>
<div>
Aula magna storica</div>
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<br /></div>
<div>
Full programme <a href="http://stals.sssup.it/files/Hungary%20and%20Poland.pdf">here</a> </div>
</div>
MaestroGustavohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00878250342135981894noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7468230004636317762.post-66626550230835410942017-01-05T08:32:00.001-08:002017-01-05T08:32:13.913-08:00<div style="text-align: center;">
<b>Comparing Judicial Activism – Can We Say that the US Supreme Court is More Activist than the German Constitutional Court?</b></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<b><br /></b></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<b><br /></b></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<b>Nuno M. Garoupa </b></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
Texas A&M University School of Law; Catholic University of Portugal (UCP) - Católica Global School of Law</div>
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<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
December 19, 2016</div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia (RPF), Special Issue on Democracy in Question, vol. 72 (4), 2016 </div>
<br />
Abstract: <br />
Although widely used, “judicial activism” is a diffused and, to some extent, an empty concept. However, if it is to be useful in comparative law and politics, a transparent and consistent definition of “judicial activism” has to be developed. We assess different approaches and the consequent comparative implications. We conclude that, at some levels, we can answer whether or not the US Supreme Court is more activist than the German Constitutional Court. Nevertheless, such question cannot be addressed satisfactorily once we understand the complexities of “judicial activism.”<br />
<br />
Number of Pages in PDF File: 16<br />
<br />
Keywords: judicial activism, constitutional review, constraint, restraint<br />
<br />
Full text available at: <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2887650">https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2887650</a>MaestroGustavohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00878250342135981894noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7468230004636317762.post-82048532127708153412017-01-05T08:31:00.000-08:002017-01-05T08:31:04.109-08:00<div style="text-align: center;">
<b>Convergence, Compatibility or Decoration: The Luxembourg Court's References to Strasbourg Case Law in its Final Judgments</b></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<b><br /></b></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<b><br /></b></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<b>Fan Jizeng </b></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna, Students; Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna di Pisa - Faculty of Law</div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
October 21, 2016</div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
Pécs Journal of International and European Law, 2016, no.2, pp.38-67 </div>
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<div style="text-align: justify;">
Abstract: </div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
Although the EU is not a Contracting Party to the European Convention yet, the ECHR and its Strasbourg Case-law do have an impact on the EU legal order. Before the Lisbon Treaty came into effect, the Court of Justice of the EU and the drafters of the Maastricht Treaty recognized that the ECHR and the ECtHR case law had a special significance for the EU legal order and regarded them as one part of the general principle of EU law. The Lisbon Treaty entitles the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights the primary legislation from which the Court could depart in its deliberation. According to Art.53(3) and the relevant Official Explanation, the Court of Justice should take the Strasbourg jurisprudence into account when it needs to define the scope and meaning of fundamental rights borrowed from the ECHR and its case-law. Although the CJEU still lacks a set of uniform rules on the reference to the Strasbourg case-law, and even the European judges motivations on the Strasbourg case-law reference are varied, this method can be regarded as one of the best resolutions on the elimination of the jurisprudential conflicts between the two European Courts. From a functional perspective, the function of the Strasbourg case-law reference can be divided into four categories: authoritative guidance, legitimate guidance, reference “by analogy”, and decorative reference. In particular, the function of legitimate guidance can even be re-divided into three sub-functions: guidance, conformation to legitimacy, and warning the member states against the undermining of the Strasbourg jurisprudence as well as a comparative analysis of similarity and difference between EU law and ECHR.</div>
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Number of Pages in PDF File: 30</div>
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Keywords: case-law reference, Luxembourg judgments, fundamental rights, comparative law, Strasbourg case law.</div>
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<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
Full text available at: <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2884664">https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2884664</a></div>
MaestroGustavohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00878250342135981894noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7468230004636317762.post-14622463418631357612017-01-05T08:29:00.005-08:002017-01-05T08:29:49.936-08:00<div style="text-align: center;">
<b>¿Pueden Haber Enmiendas Constitucionales Inconstitucionales? Una Mirada Al Derecho Comparado (Can There Be Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments? A Comparative Perspective)</b></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<b><br /></b></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<b><br /></b></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<b>Joel I. Colón-Ríos </b></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
Victoria University of Wellington - Faculty of Law</div>
<br />
<div style="text-align: center;">
2008</div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
42 Rev. Jur. U.I.P. 207 (2008) </div>
<br />
Abstract: <br />
Spanish Abstract: Este artículo tiene tres objetivos principales. Primero, analizar las bases teóricas de la doctrina de los límites implícitos al poder de reforma. Segundo, examinar las maneras en que dicha doctrina a sido tratada en diversas jurisdicciones (incluyendo Estados Unidos, Alemania, India, y Colombia). Finalmente, considerar la doctrina la luz del ordenamiento jurídico puertorriqueño.<br />
<br />
English Abstract: This article has three main objectives. First, to analyze the theoretical bases of the doctrine of the implicit limits to the power of constitutional reform. Second, to examine the ways in which this doctrine has been treated in various jurisdictions (including the United States, Germany, India, and Colombia). Finally, to consider the doctrine the light of the Puerto Rican legal system.<br />
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<br />
<br />
Number of Pages in PDF File: 53<br />
<br />
Keywords: Constitutional Law, Comparative Law<br />
<br />
Full text available at: <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2883901">https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2883901</a>MaestroGustavohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00878250342135981894noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7468230004636317762.post-49736653184962409132017-01-05T08:28:00.003-08:002017-01-05T08:28:19.204-08:00<div style="text-align: center;">
<b>Global Constitutionalism - A Critical View</b></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<b><br /></b></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<b><br /></b></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<b>Jaakko Husa </b></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
University of Lapland - Faculty of Law</div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
December 1, 2016</div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
Maastricht European Private Law Institute Working Paper No. 2016/11 </div>
<br />
Abstract: <br />
Drawing on comparative law scholarship this paper discusses global constitutionalism from a critical point of view. Many contemporary authors seem to presume that the idea of constitutionalism must be universal. In agreement with this thinking the commitment to the rule of law, democracy and human rights has arguably become a defining global factor. Allegedly, constitutionalism is regarded as relevant not only in the context of States but also when we assess and interpret development of law beyond the State. This paper analyses underlying themes and calls the universality of global constitutionalism into question.<br />
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Number of Pages in PDF File: 19<br />
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Keywords: Constitutionalism, Global Law, Globalization, Comparative Law<br />
<br />
Full text available at: <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2885490">https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2885490</a>MaestroGustavohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00878250342135981894noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7468230004636317762.post-83680482291240892662016-11-28T05:40:00.001-08:002016-11-28T05:40:14.083-08:00La Corte Oltre Lo Specchio: Un Dialogo Tra Giudici Costituzionali, Con Sabino Cassese E Daria De Pretis (The Court Through the Looking-Glass - A Dialogue between Constitutional Justices: An Interview with Sabino Cassese and Daria de Pretis)<div style="text-align: center;">
<b>La Corte Oltre Lo Specchio: Un Dialogo Tra Giudici Costituzionali, Con Sabino Cassese E Daria De Pretis (The Court Through the Looking-Glass - A Dialogue between Constitutional Justices: An Interview with Sabino Cassese and Daria de Pretis)</b></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<b>Giacomo Rugge </b></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law</div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<b>Valentina Volpe </b></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law</div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
2016</div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law & International Law (MPIL) Research Paper No. 6/2016 </div>
<br />
Abstract: <br />
Italian Abstract: La seguente intervista ai professori Sabino Cassese e Daria de Pretis, rispettivamente giudice emerito e giudice della Corte costituzionale italiana, si è svolta il 12 novembre 2015 nell’ambito dei Dialoghi Italiani, il discussion group del Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law (MPIL) di Heidelberg dedicato al mondo politico e istituzionale italiano.<br />
<br />
L’incontro - in lingua italiana e rivolto a un pubblico di accademici italiani e stranieri - ha seguito il formato della doppia intervista toccando alcuni dei temi più attuali che investono la Corte costituzionale italiana: dalla tutela dei diritti acquisiti all’introduzione della dissenting opinion, dalle dinamiche decisionali interne, al ruolo della comparazione e dei network informali di giudici nell’adozione delle decisioni. Il risultato è stato un vivo scambio d'idee e di opinioni, a tratti convergenti a tratti divergenti, ma sempre alte e preziose per comprendere il vero significato dell’attività della Corte.<br />
<br />
Il titolo dell’incontro si è ispirato al seguito di Alice nel Paese delle Meraviglie1, il cui incipit vede Alice domandarsi davanti allo specchio se davvero l’immagine riflessa della stanza corrisponda al vero e cosa si nasconda invece in quello squarcio nascosto alla vista dell’osservatore. Questo dialogo-intervista è nato dalla stessa curiosità di Alice per ciò che si vede e per ciò che non si vede e siamo grati ai giudici costituzionali Sabino Cassese e Daria de Pretis e ai direttori del MPIL, Armin von Bogdandy e Anne Peters, per aver consentito la sua realizzazione, contribuendo a svelare la Corte oltre lo specchio.<br />
<br />
English Abstract: The following interview with professors Sabino Cassese and Daria de Pretis, Emeritus Justice and Justice, respectively, of the Italian Constitutional Court, took place on 12 November 2015 as part of Dialoghi Italiani, the discussion group of the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law (MPIL) in Heidelberg dedicated to examining significant developments in the Italian political and institutional world.<br />
<br />
The meeting - held in Italian and addressed to both Italian and international academics - followed the format of a double interview. Focusing on the most relevant issues that affect the functioning and working methods of the Italian Constitutional Court, it touched on the protection of acquired rights, the introduction of the dissenting opinion, internal decision-making dynamics and the role of comparison and informal networks of judges in the decision-making process. The result was a lively exchange of ideas and opinions - at times convergent, at times divergent - but always highly informative and precious for an understanding of the true nature and role of the Court.<br />
<br />
The title was inspired by the sequel to Alice in Wonderland, whose incipit depicts Alice standing in front of a mirror, wondering if the reflection of the room she sees indeed corresponds to reality and what lies beyond her view. This dialogue-interview originated from the same curiosity that inspired Alice to ponder what she saw and what the mirror did not reveal.<br />
<br />
Note: We are grateful to Justice Sabino Cassese and Justice Daria de Pretis as well as to the Directors of the MPIL, Armin von Bogdandy and Anne Peters, for allowing us to conduct this interview and thus observe the Court through the looking-glass.<br />
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Downloadable document is available in Italian.<br />
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Number of Pages in PDF File: 19<br />
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Keywords: Italian Constitutional Court, constitutional justice, comparative law, dissenting opinion<br />
<br />
Full text: <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2865686">https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2865686</a>MaestroGustavohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00878250342135981894noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7468230004636317762.post-85509228794769001792016-11-14T12:08:00.001-08:002016-11-14T12:08:04.100-08:00Mayoral, In the CJEU Judges Trust: A New Approach in the Judicial Construction of Europe JCMS<div style="text-align: center;">
<b>In the CJEU Judges Trust: A New Approach in the Judicial Construction of Europe</b></div>
<br />
<div style="text-align: center;">
Juan A. Mayoral</div>
<br />
This article aims to highlight the relevance of judicial trust in international courts, focusing on national judges' trust in the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). EU scholars have put a great deal of effort into explaining how legal and political factors affect the use of preliminary references by national courts. However, there is still a gap in the literature on the development of trust as a functional principle encouraging co-operation between national and international courts. This article explores the nature, causes and potentials of judicial trust for the EU judicial system. A theory is offered in the article, which links national judges' trust in the CJEU to their corporatist identification and profile, to their attitudes towards the EU, and to their beliefs about the CJEU's ability to provide decisions that: 1) offer a clear guidance on European Union law, and 2) will not undermine Member States' legal order.<br />
<br />
<a href="http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/wol1/doi/10.1111/jcms.12488/abstract">http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/wol1/doi/10.1111/jcms.12488/abstract</a>MaestroGustavohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00878250342135981894noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7468230004636317762.post-68268458870446527082016-09-15T07:26:00.004-07:002016-09-15T07:28:55.629-07:00STALS Newsletter<div style="text-align: justify;">
Dear friends and colleagues,</div>
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we are pleased to announce the contents of this new STALS newsletter.</div>
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<div style="text-align: justify;">
Stals Research Papers</div>
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<div style="text-align: justify;">
F. Masini, “Towards a Federal Structure of Economic Governance in the Eurozone”, STALS Research Paper 1/2016,<a href="http://www.stals.sssup.it/files/masini%20stals.pdf"> http://www.stals.sssup.it/files/masini%20stals.pdf </a></div>
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M. Kölling , ”The EU budget - from a bargaining tool to a federal budget?”, STALS Research Paper 2/2016,<a href="http://www.stals.sssup.it/files/koelling%20stals.pdf"> http://www.stals.sssup.it/files/koelling%20stals.pdf </a></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
STALS events</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
29 September 2016</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
“A genealogy of public security: the theory and history of modern police powers”</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<a href="http://stals.sssup.it/files/campesi.pdf">http://stals.sssup.it/files/campesi.pdf</a></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
4 November 2016</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
“Crisi dell'euro e conflitto sociale. L'illusione della giustizia attraverso il mercato”</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<a href="http://stals.sssup.it/files/guazzaeuro.pdf">http://stals.sssup.it/files/guazzaeuro.pdf</a></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
1 December 2016</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
“Il principio dei best interests of the child: un dialogo”</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<a href="http://stals.sssup.it/files/lamarque.pdf">http://stals.sssup.it/files/lamarque.pdf </a></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
New Projects</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
European Public Law-ius (Eur.Publ.ius) 574669-EPP-1-2016-1-IT-EPPJMO-MODULE</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<a href="http://www.santannapisa.it/it/ricerca/progetti/jean-monnet-module-european-public-law-ius-eurpublius">http://www.santannapisa.it/it/ricerca/progetti/jean-monnet-module-european-public-law-ius-eurpublius</a> </div>
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All the best from Pisa,</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
the Editors</div>
<div>
<br /></div>
MaestroGustavohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00878250342135981894noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7468230004636317762.post-83799985544904007462016-09-15T07:16:00.002-07:002016-09-15T07:16:15.887-07:00Brexit and the Future of the United Kingdom<div style="text-align: justify;">
Brexit and the Future of the United Kingdom</div>
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<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
Etain Tannam</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
ABSTRACT</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
This paper aims to assess the significance of Brexit for the future of the UK as a unitary state and to identify various possible outcome to the future of the UK. The first part provides an overview of the current status of Scotland and Northern Ireland in the UK and the differences between both</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
cases. The second part of the article assesses the significance of the EU for the devolved administrations and analyses key party responses to the Brexit debate in Scotland and Northern</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
Ireland. In conclusion the impact of Brexit on the future of the UK as unitary state is assessed.</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
Full text available at:</div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<a href="http://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iaiwp1616.pdf">http://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iaiwp1616.pdf</a></div>
MaestroGustavohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00878250342135981894noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7468230004636317762.post-48313639654307893942016-09-09T01:41:00.001-07:002016-09-09T01:41:20.978-07:00<div style="text-align: center;">
<b>What is Judicial Supremacy?</b></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<b><br /></b></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<b><br /></b></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<b>Stephen Gardbaum </b></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - School of Law</div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
September 8, 2016</div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
in Comparative Constitutional Theory (Gary Jacobsohn & Miguel Schor eds., Elgar Publishing), Forthcoming </div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
UCLA School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 16-39 </div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
Abstract: </div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
Judicial supremacy is a concept frequently employed in both domestic and comparative constitutional theory but rarely carefully defined and systematically analyzed. Scholars typically either assume its meaning or quickly state how they are using the term before warming to their major theme, focusing on some other aspect of judicial supremacy: how did it emerge, what explains its acceptance by other branches of government, is it or should it be tempered in practice by courts not straying too far from the popular will, is it a good, bad, or practically necessary feature of a constitutional system? Jeremy Waldron's observation that the term has "no canonical definition" suggests that it is not always used in uniform fashion but rather in somewhat different ways in different contexts. Moreover, this range of uses helps to explain why, on only slightly closer inspection, various critics or skeptics of "judicial supremacy" around the world ― departmentalists, "hollow hopers," constitutional dialogists ― do not all seem to be making the same point, but appear to be interlocutors in a number of discrete conversations, differing in both the type and content of their arguments and the positions they are marshaled to support.</div>
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<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: justify;">
This chapter attempts to provide the systematic analysis of the concept that is mostly missing and that is a prerequisite for understanding and assessing the several debates in which it plays a central role. It also aims to evaluate its usefulness as a concept in the toolbox of comparative constitutional theory. Part II identifies and disaggregates four distinct senses or conceptions of judicial supremacy in the relevant literatures, what I shall refer to as "interpretive," "attitudinal," "decisional," and "political supremacy" respectively. It also shows that corresponding to each of the meanings is a distinct opposing or skeptical position. Part III illustrates the multiple meanings by looking at recent resolutions of the same-sex marriage issue by different institutions and mechanisms ― courts, legislatures, popular referenda, courts and legislatures ― in many constitutional systems over the past decade. Part IV attempts to asses the utility of judicial supremacy as a concept in comparative constitutional theory by asking what and how much is at stake in the debates between each conception and its critics. The chapter concludes that, as delimited by the four senses identified, although not as sometimes exaggerated or conflated, it is indeed a useful, non-unitary concept. Its essential status in the field, however, likely turns on further comparative experience.</div>
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Number of Pages in PDF File: 38</div>
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Keywords: Judicial Supremacy, Departmentalism, Constitutional Interpretation, Same-Sex Marriage, Political Empowerment, Weak-Form Judicial Review, Comparative Constitutional Theory</div>
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Full text available at: <a href="http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2835682">http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2835682</a></div>
MaestroGustavohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00878250342135981894noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7468230004636317762.post-71468472464148947792016-09-09T01:40:00.003-07:002016-09-09T01:40:33.458-07:00<div style="text-align: center;">
<b>Formal Versus Functional Method in Comparative Constitutional Law</b></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<b><br /></b></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<b><br /></b></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<b>Francesca Bignami </b></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
George Washington University - Law School</div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
2016</div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
Osgoode Hall Law Journal, Vol. 53(2), p. 442-471, 2016 </div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
GWU Law School Public Law Research Paper No. 2016-39 </div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
GWU Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2016-39 </div>
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Abstract: </div>
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In the field of comparative constitutional law, the dominant approach to concept formation and research design is formal. That is, comparative projects generally identify what counts as the supreme law that can be enforced against all other sources of law based on the “constitutional” label of the positive law (written constitutions and the jurisprudence of constitutional courts) and the law books. This formal method, however, has significant limitations when compared with the functional method used in the field of comparative law more generally speaking. After a brief exposition of the functional method, this article explores the advantages of the functional method as applied to comparative constitutional law with the problem of judicial review (based on the supreme law) of social and economic policy-making in France, the United States, and Germany. Only in Germany is this law contained in constitutional law. In France, the supreme law is to be found largely in administrative law, because the constitutional court faces an institutional competitor, some would say superior, in the highest administrative court (Conseil d’État). In the United States, the supreme law is to be found in administrative law because economic and social rights — the rights that most directly affect this area of state activity — have largely been read out of constitutional law. Based on the functional method, the article proceeds to identify the similarities that unite the law of France and Germany and that set it apart from the law of the United States. It also outlines the important avenues of theoretical inquiry triggered by these similarities and differences in judicial review. The article concludes by sketching a functional agenda for empirical research in comparative constitutional law.</div>
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Full text available at: <a href="http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2835721">http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2835721</a></div>
MaestroGustavohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00878250342135981894noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7468230004636317762.post-51400396412612281942016-08-26T06:22:00.004-07:002016-08-26T06:22:56.646-07:00<div style="text-align: center;">
<b>Upholding Judicial Supremacy in India: The NJAC Judgment in Comparative Perspective</b></div>
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<b>Rehan Abeyratne </b></div>
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Jindal Global Law School</div>
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August 22, 2016</div>
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George Washington International Law Review (Forthcoming) </div>
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Abstract: <br />
On October 16, 2015, the Supreme Court of India issued a landmark judgment holding the National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) unconstitutional. This Article argues that the judgment is flawed in two ways. First, it held that the Indian Constitution requires sitting judges to have the final word on judicial appointments. Neither the constitutional text nor the Constituent Assembly Debates provides any support for this conclusion. Second, the judgment does not explain how this sort of judicial primacy promotes or secures judicial independence. A comparative analysis shows that no other major constitutional democracy gives judges the final word on judicial appointments. So why is India an outlier? I argue that peculiar political and historical circumstances required the Indian judiciary to assume an outsized role. The NJAC Judgment is, therefore, best understood in institutional terms: it represents the judiciary’s reluctance to cede its supremacy to the political branches of government.<br />
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Number of Pages in PDF File: 40<br />
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Keywords: Judicial Appointments, Judicial Independence, Indian Constitution, Comparative Constitutional Law<br />
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Full text available at: <a href="http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2827793">http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2827793</a>MaestroGustavohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00878250342135981894noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7468230004636317762.post-10252631603747846122016-08-25T09:58:00.002-07:002016-08-25T09:58:18.985-07:00<div style="text-align: center;">
<b>Paradise Lost: Can the European Union Expel Countries from the Eurozone?</b></div>
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<b>Jens Dammann </b></div>
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University of Texas at Austin - School of Law</div>
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August 26, 2015</div>
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Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 47, No. 2, 2016 </div>
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Abstract: <br />
There was a time, not too long ago, when the introduction of the euro was hailed as a tremendous success. Yet the Eurozone now faces an existential crisis. A number of member states have, since 2008, been prevented from defaulting on their sovereign debt only by massive bailouts. Greece has teetered on the verge of insolvency for years even despite repeated such measures.<br />
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Many observers now believe that Greece should not stay in the European Union but leave the eurozone, a scenario often referred to as the “Grexit.” This would allow Greece to devalue its currency and thereby render its economy more competitive. But just as crucially, from the perspective of Greece’s sharpest critics, a Grexit would rid the Eurozone of a member state that may no longer be willing to abide by the Eurozone’s austerity-oriented economic policies, which aim at limiting budget deficits and government debt even in times of economic distress. The current Greek government is adamantly opposed to leaving the Eurozone, but this has not put an end to the debate. Rather, a growing chorus of politicians and pundits now argue that Greece should be expelled from the Eurozone.<br />
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Of course, this demand raises a fundamental legal question: Is it possible — and should it be — to terminate a country’s membership in the Eurozone without that country’s consent? This Article argues that in narrowly defined circumstances, a right to expel countries from the Eurozone not only is desirable as a matter of legal policy but also deserves recognition as a matter of black letter law. However, this Article also shows that such an expulsion has to remain an ultima ratio. As of now, Greece does not even come close to satisfying its conditions.<br />
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Number of Pages in PDF File: 55<br />
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Keywords: Grexit, Eurozone, Expulsion, EU, Euro<br />
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Full text available at: <a href="http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2827699">http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2827699</a>MaestroGustavohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00878250342135981894noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7468230004636317762.post-87215345956923782272016-08-25T09:57:00.000-07:002016-08-25T09:57:06.331-07:00<div style="text-align: center;">
<b>How Brexit Will Happen: A Brief Primer on EU Law and Constitutional Law Questions Raised by Brexit</b></div>
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<b>Holger P. Hestermeyer </b></div>
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King's College London - The Dickson Poon School of Law; A Dickson Poon Transnational Law Institute</div>
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August 17, 2016</div>
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Journal of International Arbitration 2016 </div>
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Abstract: <br />
In a referendum held in the UK on 23 June 2016, 51.9% of the participating electorate voted to leave the European Union. The number of legal questions raised by the referendum are breathtaking. This article tackles two of them: it discusses questions of UK constitutional law involved in deciding to leave the Union, namely the role of referenda, sovereignty of Parliament, the scope of the royal prerogative and devolution, as well as the basic EU law rules concerning the withdrawal process as contained in Art. 50 of the TEU. The latter involves issues such as the start of the negotiations, their content, length, how they will be conducted and whether the UK can conclude trade agreements during the Art. 50 negotiations process.<br />
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Number of Pages in PDF File: 22<br />
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Keywords: Brexit, sovereignty, sovereignty of Parliament, royal prerogative, trade, common commercial policy, Commission, Council, WTO, EFTA<br />
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Full text available at.: <a href="http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2825092">http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2825092</a>MaestroGustavohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00878250342135981894noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7468230004636317762.post-11089808996648986442016-08-25T09:55:00.003-07:002016-08-25T09:55:32.927-07:00<div style="text-align: center;">
<b>Making Effective Use of Article 260 TFEU</b></div>
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<b>Pål Wennerås </b></div>
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Office of the Attorney General, Norway</div>
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August 10, 2016</div>
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Forthcoming in A. Jakab and D. Kochenov, The Enforcement of EU law and Values (OUP 2017) </div>
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Abstract: <br />
Much has been written on Article 260 TFEU, and the refrain continues along the lines that it is a potentially effective instrument for securing compliance with EU law which has yet to materialise. Some have started to question whether pecuniary sanctions can ever be an effective tool and have eyed the political procedure in Article 7 TEU with a glimmer of hope. But since money talks and the conditions in Article 7 TEU are onerous, it seems premature to discard the value of Article 260 TFEU just yet. But what then is the problem and is it possible to do anything about it? That is the topic of this chapter, which examines the design of the system and its application by the Commission and the Court.<br />
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Number of Pages in PDF File: 20<br />
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Keywords: Article 258 TFEU, Article 260 TFEU, infringement proceedings, penalty payment, lump sum, sanctions, enforcement<br />
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Full text available at: <a href="http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2821032">http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2821032</a>MaestroGustavohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/00878250342135981894noreply@blogger.com0