The International Law of Game of Thrones

Perry S. Bechky 

International Trade & Investment Law PLLC; Seattle University School of Law
August 28, 2015

Alabama Law Review Online, Vol. 67, No. 1, 2015 
Abstract:      

Game of Thrones depicts a violent and, some might say, lawless world. Few would think that world evidences much international law. Yet, this article identifies several rules of international law observable on the show and relates them to real-world international law. Observable rules include some fundaments of the law of treaties, customary norms, and (most surprisingly) at least one humanitarian peremptory norm. These rules cover a range of subjects, including sovereignty, state responsibility, jurisdiction, immunities, and human rights. The article also discusses the special legal status of the Night’s Watch, which is governed by the most important legal “text” in Game of Thrones. Finally, the article tries to have some fun.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 16

Keywords: Game of Thrones, public international law, human rights, treaties

Full text available: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2652451

Revolutionary Constitutionalism

Stephen Gardbaum 

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - School of Law
August 26, 2015

UCLA School of Law Research Paper No. 15-26 
Abstract:      

One important recent trend in constitution-making around the world has been revolutionary constitutionalism: using the constitution-making process to attempt to institutionalize and bring to a successful conclusion a political revolution. Although a good deal of attention has been paid to the specific revolutions involved, there has been far less on the general phenomenon ofrevolutionary constitutionalism as such. This article attempts to begin redressing this gap by offering some reflections on the general phenomenon and then employing them to inform an analysis of constitution-making in the revolutionary context.

The article makes three main claims. The first is that revolutionary constitutionalism is a useful and illuminating category for the discipline of comparative constitutional law. Empirically, it encompasses a range of situations that implicate constitutionalism in a particular way and raise special challenges. Analytically, it is a distinct concept from the neighboring term "constitutional revolution." Recognizing this permits us to distinguish, for example, the American Revolution from the New Deal constitutional revolution in qualitative terms, as different in kind and not merely degree. The second is that revolutionary constitutionalism contains within itself certain paradoxes and practical problems that have their source in the combination of initial radical transition and subsequent resistance to further radical change that constitutionalization brings. The final claim concerns the role and importance of constitution-making in the revolutionary context. Although relative to a broad array of socio-political variables, this role is generally less central to the ultimate outcomes of revolutionary constitutionalism than constitutional lawyers often think, it can respond to one distinctive challenge: the need to re-establish political authority lost by the old regime. As the comparison between recent experiences in Egypt and Tunisia suggests, constitution-making can make a key contribution here as one source of the legitimacy that the new regime must acquire.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 42

Keywords: revolutionary constitutionalism, constitutional revolution, constitutionalism, American Revolution, Arab Spring, constitution-making

Full text available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2651667

Friday 25 September 2015 - Saturday 26 September 2015. Institute of European and Comparative Law General Principles of Law: European and Comparative Perspectives. Celebrating 20 Years of the Institute of European and Comparative Law.

from: http://www.law.ox.ac.uk/event=13673

"‘General principles of law’ are one of the most visible areas of intersection between EU law and comparative law: as long as they are understood as ‘the general principles common to the laws of the Member States’ (Art 340(2) TFEU) their fleshing out requires careful comparative preparatory work. True, more often than not, the general principles of EU law were not developed on the basis of thorough and textbook style analysis. This does not make it less interesting to look at the interaction of EU law and comparative law in this particular field. Those working together in elaborating general principles of EU law tend to be responsive to input from national laws, and the laws of the Member States have no choice but to be responsive to the general principles developed at EU level.

It is the purpose of this conference to look at this particular interaction from the perspectives of EU law and comparative law alike. Leading scholars and practitioners from both fields will come together to discuss the most recent developments in the field.

There will be one general (assembly) session exploring the theoretical and conceptual issues surrounding the notion of ‘general principles of EU law’ and two thematic sessions looking at specific examples of how these principle operate in practice. One session will chart how a well-established general principle, the principle of proportionality, has been implemented in the laws of the member states: is there ‘a’ general principle of proportionality, or are there 27 (or: 29) principles? Another session will be devoted to the emergence of two general principles of EU law in private law, party autonomy and the protection of the ‘weaker’ party, and will focus on the difficulties that arise when these principles conflict. Finally, there will be another assembly session on the legitimacy of judicial creation of general principles of law.

In keeping with the distinctive brand of scholarship promoted by the Oxford Institute, each topic will be addressed by both EU and comparative lawyers. Both perspectives will be given equal weight, and the focus will be on the interactions. And of course we aim to look at all the issues within their broader historical, jurisprudential and political context.

The conference will be held on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the Oxford Institute. It will bring together current and former members, visitors and friends of the Institute, as well as those who might belong to one of these categories in the future. Celebration will be an essential part of the proceedings!"

Full programme here:https://intranet.law.ox.ac.uk/ckfinder/userfiles/files/Programme%20July%202015(1).pdf

Further info: http://www.law.ox.ac.uk/event=13673

Integrating Europe. Competing paradigms for EU law. Conference University of Antwerp. 24 September 2015

Integrating Europe. Competing paradigms for EU law

University of Antwerp, Law School

24 September 2015

StadsCampus, C.002

Integrating Europe. Competing paradigms for EU law

Programme

9.30-9.45 Introduction

Gert Straetmans (University of Antwerp) and Marta Simoncini (University of Antwerp and King’s College London)

9.45-10.30 Key Note Speech

Peter Lindseth (University of Connecticut), Paradigms, Paradoxes, and Contradictions in EU Public Law

10.30-11.00 Coffee break

11.00-12.00 Panel I: Questioning paradigms

Chair: Patricia Popelier (University of Antwerp)

Giuseppe Martinico (Scuola Sant’Anna, Pisa), Openness between Constitutionalism and Pluralism. The Case of EU Law

Marta Simoncini (University of Antwerp and King’s College London), EU Law and the Limits of Delegation. The Case of EU Agencies

12.00-13.45 Lunch and refreshments

13.45-14.45 Panel II: Paradigms and the economic crisis

Chair: A.-M. Van den Bossche (University of Antwerp)

Federico Fabbrini (University of Copenhagen), The Euro-crisis and Constitutional Change: The Implications of the EMU Reform on Balance of Powers in the EU

Werner Vandenbruwaene (University of Antwerp), Competing Trends in Financial Law and Policy: Integration and Differentiation

14.45-15.45 Panel III: Paradigms for consumer protection in EU law

Chair: Gert Straetmans (University of Antwerp)

Marjia Bartl (University of Amsterdam), Wavering Legitimacy of European Private Law

Geraint Howells (City University of Hong Kong), The Balance between Private Law and Administrative Protection for Consumers

15.45-16.15 Coffee break

16.15-17.15 Panel III: Paradigms for EU external relations

Chair: Alexia Herwig (University of Antwerp)

Peter Van Elsuwege (University of Ghent), The Constitutional Approach to EU External Relations: An Analysis of the Post-Lisbon Practice

Christina Eckes (University of Amsterdam), Common Foreign and Security Policy: Judicial Review and its Costitutionalising Consequences

17.15-17.45 Round session: discussion

19.00 Social dinner

Further info: https://www.uantwerpen.be/popup/kalenderonderdeel.aspx?calitem_id=2845&c=LANDP302&n=106841

I-CONnect Video Interview Series: Italian Constitutional Law, Featuring Cristina Fasone

Taken from: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCAJYkEi5aLIKExBMwH_wK_w

"An interview with Cristina Fasone of the European University Institute and LUISS Guido Carli University on developments in Italian constitutional law. The interview is conducted by Richard Albert, co-editor of I-CONnect and constitutional law professor at Boston College Law School."

Full interview here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HnZyw54CCu0

I-CONnect Video Interview Series: French Constitutional Law, Featuring François-Xavier Millet

Taken from: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCAJYkEi5aLIKExBMwH_wK_w

"An interview with François-Xavier Millet of the University of the French West Indies on developments in French constitutional law. The interview is conducted by Richard Albert, co-editor of I-CONnect and constitutional law professor at Boston College Law School."

Full interview available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Vv7Tpw-AZbU

When Judges Have Reasons Not to Give Reasons: A Comparative Law Approach

Mathilde Cohen 

University of Connecticut - School of Law
2015

Washington and Lee Law Review, Vol. 72, 2015 
Abstract:      

Influential theories of law have celebrated judicial reason- giving as furthering a host of democratic values, including judges’ accountability, citizens’ participation in adjudication, and a more accurate and transparent decision-making process. This Article has two main purposes. First, it argues that although reason- giving is important, it is often in tension with other values of the judicial process, such as guidance, sincerity, and efficiency. Reason-giving must, therefore, be balanced against these competing values. In other words, judges sometimes have reasons not to give reasons. Second, contrary to common intuition, common law and civil law systems deal with this tension between reasons for and against reason-giving in increasingly similar ways.

By combining theories of democratic legitimacy with empirical, doctrinal, and historical evidence of judges’ concrete reason-giving practices in the United States and Europe, the Article argues that rather than being in opposition, these two legal cultures are converging toward a common methodology. No longer can it be assumed that civil law judges and common law judges are on opposite ends of the spectrum.

Full text available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2646871