Sabino Cassese - La diffusione della giustizia costituzionale nel mondo - Trento, 10 maggio 2016

Università degli Studi di Trento - Facoltà di Giurisprudenza
Incontri di Diritto pubblico a.a. 2015-2016
Lectio magistralis del Prof. Sabino Cassese

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1ig-YFe_M5E

Intervista Prof. Cassese, Presente e futuro della formazione giuridica: a colloquio con il professor Sabino Cassese.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2FJCqIB94vE

Better together or happy apart? Independence Movements in Europe

19 November 2014 - Panel discussion with Steven Blockmans, Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), Eve Hepburn, University of Edinburgh, Nico Krisch, Hertie School, Barcelona Institute of International Studies (IBEI),and Jaume López, Universitat Pompeu Fabra Barcelona. Moderation: Mark Dawson, Hertie School In partnership with the Public Diplomacy Council of Catalonia (DIPLOCAT).

Full video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a7217NhAZQQ

III Sesión de los Encuentros ¡Escolta Espanya, Escucha Cataluña!

taken from: http://www.ortegaygasset.edu/

"Estas Jornadas, organizadas por la Fundación José Ortega y Gasset - Gregorio Marañón, pretenden constituirse en un “lugar de encuentro” que haga posible escuchar las distintas voces, opiniones y perspectivas para, desde el diálogo sereno y pausado, analizar con rigor esta realidad, la cual no entendemos necesariamente como un problema, aunque no se nos ocultan los retos que plantea, sino, de igual modo que Ortega comprendía las crisis históricas, como un momento de “cambio intenso y

hondo” que no siempre tiene que ser a peor sino que puede ser también a mejor."

III Sesión de los Encuentros ¡Escolta Espanya, Escucha Cataluña!

Catalunya y España: ¿es necesaria una nueva articulación constitucional?

Fecha: 16 de junio de 2016. 9:30-14:00 horas.

Lugar de celebración: sede de la Fundación Ortega-Marañón (C/ Fortuny, 53. 28010

Madrid).

Moderador: Santiago Muñoz Machado, catedrático de Derecho Administrativo de

la Universidad Complutense de Madrid

Ponentes:

Miguel Herrero y Rodríguez de Miñón, consejero de Estado y miembro de la

Comisión que elaboró la Constitución de 1978

Santiago Vidal i Marsal, jurista y senador *

Teresa Freixes Sanjuán, catedrática de Derecho Constitucional de la Universitat

Autònoma de Barcelona

Gregorio Cámara Villar, catedrático de Derecho Constitucional de la Universidad de

Granada y diputado 

Maribel González Pascual, profesora de Derecho Constitucional de la Universitat

Pompeu Fabra

Coordinadora y relatora: Argelia Queralt Jiménez, profesora de Derecho

Constitucional de la Universitat de Barcelona

full video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5_zRIcQusqQ

full program: http://www.ortegaygasset.edu/admin/descargas/Programa%20Escolta%20Espanya%20-%20Escucha%20Catalu%C3%B1a%20v%2024-5-2016.pdf

Convegno annuale "Gruppo di Pisa", Cos'è un diritto fondamentale? 10-11 giugno 2016

Convegno annuale dell’Associazione sul tema “Cos’è un diritto fondamentale?” (Università degli studi di Cassino e del Lazio Meridionale, Via Sant’Angelo s.n.c., campus Folcara, Palazzo Studi).
Di seguito le relazioni:

Marco Dani, Libertà personale e incriminazione penale: studio sulla portata garantista dei diritti fondamentali

Elettra Stradella, I diritti fondamentali nelle Corti

Benedetta Vimercati, Il diritto ai beni vitali

Vincenzo Baldini, Che cosa è un diritto fondamentale

Giorgio Repetto, Il diritto alla cultura

Roberto Cherchi, I diritti dello straniero e la democrazia

full video:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lWaSeazcXY4

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NWs-ayoHs_g

Comparative Constitutional Rights of Children

Warren Binford 

Willamette University College of Law

June 9, 2016

Max Planck Encyclopedia of Comparative Constitutional Law, 2016 

Abstract:      

The origins and import of the constitutional recognition of children’s rights can be traced through some of the most important legal documents of the last 800 years, including the Magna Carta, the English Bill of Rights, the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, and the United States Bill of Rights. Both human rights and the cultural and historical weight accorded to the recognition of rights through constitutional expression are derived from these documents and the values they embodied. But it was the intersection of the more recent rise of international recognition of children’s rights in the global community during the 20th century with that historical precedent of embedding legal and political rights within national constitutions that laid a fertile foundation for the widespread constitutionalization of children’s rights in numerous countries around the world since 1989. Factor in decolonialization and the collapse of the Soviet Bloc -- providing an expansion in recognition of rights-holding populations and opportunities to establish new governments and draft new constitutions -- and it becomes clear that children’s rights advocates were provided the perfect moment in history to domesticate what had become nearly universal recognition of children as rights holders -- at least in the international community. This article was prepared for the Max Planck Encyclopedia of Comparative Constitutional Law and provides a comparative overview of the constitutionalization of children's rights around the world over the past century.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 23

Keywords: children's rights, constitutions, international human rights, comparative law

Full text available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2792513

Pluralising Constitutional Pluralism

Cormac S. Mac Amhlaigh 

University of Edinburgh - School of Law

April 8, 2016

N. Roughan and A. Halpin (eds) In Pursuit of Pluralist Jurisprudence (Cambridge University Press, Forthcoming) 

Edinburgh School of Law Research Paper No. 2016/10 

Abstract:      

This chapter addresses a relatively neglected area of the burgeoning literature on constitutional pluralism; its ‘methodological monism’. Virtually all accounts of constitutional pluralism assume that one model or framework of constitutional pluralism can account for and/or legitimise interacting and conflicting legal orders in a global context. Yet, the chapter argues, this methodological monism is incompatible with constitutional pluralism’s reliance on the statements of legal officials, both state and supra state, in the development of models of constitutional pluralism. Within a ‘global disorder’ of legal orders lies a ‘global disorder’ of legal officials and a concomitant ‘global disorder’ of suprastate claims of legal authority and effectiveness which impacts upon how legal orders interact and conflict. In this light of this, constitutional pluralism, particularly in its explanatory guise, cannot hope to capture the state of the global disorder of interacting legal orders if it insists upon one model to explain them all. Contrasting the claims of the Courts of the European Union and European Convention of Human Rights, the chapter shows how different models of constitutional pluralism are necessary to explain different interactions and conflicts between legal orders. It concludes, therefore, that constitutional pluralism itself needs to be pluralised.

Keywords: Constitutional pluralism; post national law; transnational legal theory; EU law; ECHR law

Full text available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2760986

Antonin Scalia, Living Constitutionalist

Cass R. Sunstein 

Harvard Law School

April 6, 2016

Harvard Law Review, Forthcoming 

Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 16-15 

Abstract:      

Justice Antonin Scalia was a vigorous defender of originalism, but in some of his most important opinions, he was a superb practitioner of living constitutionalism. Two of the best examples are his majority opinions in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife (involving standing) and Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council (involving “takings”). His affirmative action opinions fall in the same category, and District of Columbia v. Heller, though written in originalist terms, can easily be seen as a moral reading of the Second Amendment. One lesson involves the gravitational pull of precedents, which can draw judges away from their preferred methodologies. The larger lesson is that moral readings of the Constitution are exceptionally difficult to avoid in specific cases, even for judges who abhor them in general.

Full text available here: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2759938