sabato 28 dicembre 2013

Mapping International Adjudicative Bodies, the Issues and Players


Cesare P.R. Romano 


Loyola Law School Los Angeles

Karen J. Alter 


Northwestern University - Department of Political Science; University of Copenhagen, Faculty of Law - iCourts Center of Excellence

Yuval Shany 


Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Faculty of Law and Institute of Criminology; Israel Democracy Institute

December 17, 2013

Romano C./Alter K./Shany Y., “Mapping International Courts and Tribunals, the Issues and Players”, in Romano C./Alter K./Shany Y. (eds.), The Oxford University Press Handbook of International Adjudication, Oxford University Press, 2013, pp. 3-26
Loyola-LA Legal Studies Paper No. 2013-43 

Abstract:      
This is the first chapter of Romano C./Alter K./Shany Y. (eds.), The Oxford University Press Handbook of International Adjudication (2013). The primary goal of this introductory chapter is to document the institutional, legal, and empirical terrain that is the focus of the Handbook. It contains a quick digest for the rest of the volume, elucidating how the individual chapters connect and relate to aspects of international adjudication. The chapter begins by setting out definitional criteria and explaining key concepts, particularly what differentiates adjudicative bodies from diplomatic means and other non-binding procedures; judicial bodies from arbitral bodies; and international adjudicatory mechanisms from their domestic counterparts. The dozens of international adjudicative bodies currently existing are then arranged into two large groups: judicial bodies and arbitral bodies, and then they are divided into several sub-groups, according to similarities in structure or function. After laying down some key concepts and terms (Section I), the chapter puts forward a basic classification (Section II). It then presents the greatest challenges faced by contemporary international adjudication (Section III), the actors who participate in international adjudication and the main stakeholders (Section IV), and, finally, an overview of the main theoretical models applied to the study of international adjudication (Section V).

Number of Pages in PDF File: 25

Authoritarian Constitutionalism


Mark Tushnet 


Harvard Law School

December 18, 2013

Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 13-47 

Abstract:      
Legal scholars and political theorists interested in constitutionalism as a normative concept tend to dichotomize the subject. There is liberal constitutionalism of the sort familiar in the modern West, with core commitments to human rights and self-governance implemented by means of varying institutional devices, and there is authoritarianism, rejecting human rights entirely and governed by unconstrained power-holders. This Article explores the possibility of forms of constitutionalism other than liberal constitutionalism. The Article focuses on what I call authoritarian constitutionalism. That discussion is connected to recent literature in political science on hybrid regimes. Drawing on these literatures, this Article outlines some characteristics of authoritarian constitutionalism understood normatively.

The reason for such an exploration parallels that for the analysis of hybrid regimes. For a period those regimes were described as transitional, on the assumption that they were an intermediate point on a trajectory from authoritarianism to liberal democracy. Scholars have come to understand that we are better off seeing these regimes as a distinct type (or as several distinct types), as stable as many democracies. In short, they have pluralized the category of regime types. Similarly, I suggest, pluralizing the category of constitutionalism will enhance understanding by allowing us to draw distinctions between regimes that should be normatively distinguished.

I begin with a brief description of three forms of constitutionalism other than liberal constitutionalism. In absolutist constitutionalism, a single decision-maker motivated by an interest in the nation’s well-being consults widely and protects civil liberties generally, but in the end decides on a course of action in the decision-maker’s sole discretion, unchecked by any other institutions. In mere rule-of-law constitutionalism, the decision-maker conforms with some general procedural requirements and implements decisions through, among other things, independent courts, but is not constrained by any substantive rules regarding, for example, civil liberties. Finally, in authoritarian constitutionalism liberal freedoms are protected at an intermediate level and elections are reasonably free and fair.

The Article proceeds by describing in Part II Singapore’s constitutionalism, to motivate the later consideration of a more generalized account of authoritarian constitutionalism. Beginning the effort to pluralize the idea of constitutionalism, Part III examines the role of constitutions and courts in absolutist nations and in nations with mere rule-of-law constitutionalism. Part IV is deflationary, arguing against some political scientists’ instrumental or strategic accounts of constitutions, courts, and elections in nations with fully authoritarian systems, where liberal freedoms are not generally respected. The Part implicitly suggests that whatever semblance of true constitutionalism there is in such nations results from normative commitments by authoritarian rulers. Part V lays out some general characteristics of authoritarian constitutionalism, again with the goal of suggesting that authoritarian constitutionalism may best be defined by attributing moderately strong normative commitments to constitutionalism – not strategic calculations – to those controlling these nations. The upshot of Parts III through V is that either (a) the commitment to constitutionalism in all authoritarian regimes is a sham, or (b) at least some of them – the ones I label “authoritarian constitutionalist” – might have a normative commitment to constitutionalism. Part VI concludes with the suggestion that authoritarian constitutionalism has some normative attractions, at least in nations where the alternative of authoritarianism is more likely than that of liberal democracy.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 110

Keywords: authoritarianism, constitutionalism, Singapore

Historical Revisionism in Comparative Perspective: Law, Politics, and Surrogate Mourning


Uladzislau Belavusau 


VU University Amsterdam - Faculty of Law

December 18, 2013

EUI Department of Law Research Paper No. 12/2013 

Abstract:      
Recently the law on the Armenian genocide denial in France with a subsequent decision of the Conseil Constitutionnel (February 2012) shed fresh light on the controversial issue of historical revisionism. It disposed the issue in a wider perspective than a recurrent legal discussion on Holocaust denial. Furthermore, in drawing their bill, the authors of the French law invoked the EU Council Framework Decision 2008/913. This article demonstrates the chilling effects of that EU instrument for the freedom of speech in Europe. To these ends, it first explores the “European” model of legal engagement with historiography that is radically different from its counterpart in the USA. It further places this model in a fertile yet under-theorized comparative realm of three Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries: the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. The CEE is a primary arena of the Holocaust, a region particularly sensitive to interpretations of World War II, and a battlefield of two totalitarian regimes. In normative terms, this comparative study of semantic and pragmatic differences between historical revisionism and hate speech, of victimhood and mens rea in the crime of Holocaust denial, as well as of the appropriation of selected episodes of World War II, concludes that the criminalization of historical revisionism constitutes a substantial impairment to the freedom of (academic) expression for the sake of politics of memory (Geschichtspolitik).
Number of Pages in PDF File: 31

Keywords: Historical revisionism; Holocaust denial; Armenian genocide; hate speech; freedom of expression; EU Central and Eastern Europe; Council Decision 2008/913

The Shadow Zones of International Judicialization


Cesare P.R. Romano 


Loyola Law School Los Angeles

December 17, 2013

C. Romano, K. Alter and Y. Shany, eds., The Oxford University Press Handbook of International Adjudication, Oxford University Press, 2013, pp. 90-110
Loyola-LA Legal Studies Paper No. 2013-45 

Abstract:      
Despite the plethora of international adjudicative bodies created over time and across regions, international judicialization is still remarkably uneven. First, while some regions of the globe contain multiple, overlapping, international adjudicative bodies, others have none. Second, patterns of utilization are inconsistent. Even where international adjudicative bodies exist, certain actors use them more frequently than others. Third, certain areas of international relations have been judicialized significantly more than others. This chapter describes the current state of judicialization along these three main dimensions, highlighting the areas and issues where judicialization has not arrived, and advances some possible explanations for this puzzle.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 22

Deterritorialization in Administrative Law: Exploring Transnational Administrative Decisions


Angelos S. Gerontas 


Free University of Berlin (FUB) - Department of Law

December 12, 2013

Columbia Journal of European Law, Vol. 19, No. 3, 2013 

Abstract:      
Even though transboundary administrative cooperation procedures have gradually increased in breadth and complexity over time, transnational administrative decisions, a major legal instrument of the deterritorialization of administrative law, have not been systematically explored. Drawing on both EU and international law, this Article offers a conceptual framework of the legal instrument of transnational administrative decision and distinguishes it from other forms of deterritorialization in administrative law. To explore how foreign administrative decisions intervene in a domestic legal order, the Article presents a three-pronged classification of transnational administrative decisions on the basis of legal criteria: 1) the origin of their transnational effects under international or under EU law, 2) their normative foundation, and 3) their reviewability from national administrative authorities and national courts.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 65

The Rule of Law in Times of Crisis - A Legal Theory on the State of Emergency in the Liberal Democracy


Andrej J. Zwitter 


University of Groningen - Faculty of Law

December 1, 2012

This is an earlier draft of the article that appeared as: Andrej Zwitter, "The Rule of Law in Times of Crisis A Legal Theory on the State of Emergency in the Liberal Democracy", in Archives for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy 98, 2012: 95.
University of Groningen Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 10/2013 

Abstract:      
This article aims to contribute to the theoretical discussion about the rule of law and about its definition by looking at situations where the rule of law is put to the test – states of emergency. states of emergency and laws of exception have specific characteristics, one fundamental characteristic being that legislative power is shifted to the executive – in other words, democracies become less democratic. By analysing the principle of the rule of law in conjunction with the nature of emergencies and the structure of states of emergency, their interconnection will become more transparent. It will logically demonstrate that rules regarding states of exception concern only liberal democracies and that the rule of law has to continue its rule also within times of crisis. I will argue that there is no democracy without a conception of the rule of law and the rule of law only works in democracies and is therefore inapplicable to authoritarian regimes. Having established that, this article adds to the legal-theoretical understanding of the rules of emergency powers by elaborating them on the basis of the concepts democracy, rule of law and separation of powers.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 36

Keywords: State of emergency, rule of law, human rights, emergency powers, separation of powers,

Arab Spring – State of Emergency and Constitutional Reform


Andrej J. Zwitter 


University of Groningen - Faculty of Law

December 18, 2013

This paper is an earlier draft that is selected to appear as: Andrej Zwitter, "Arab Spring – State of Emergency and Constitutional Reform" in Air and Space Power Journal, 2014 (Forthcoming).
University of Groningen Faculty of Law Research Paper 2013 

Abstract:      
This article presents the current constitutional developments around the Arab Spring. It analyses the prospects of democratic control and the rule of law from the view of constitutional arrangements concerning states of emergency. As such each section briefly outlines the political and legal background of the country and takes a look at the legal norms concerning the state of emergency. Countries covered for the purpose of this article are those, which due to the Arab Spring are engaged in large-scale constitutional reform processes: Egypt, Tunisia and Libya. Before these case studies, the essay will outline key elements of checks and balances that derive from the principles of democracy and the rule of law for emergency regulations.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 19

Keywords: state of emergency, emergency powers, arab spring, constitutional reform