Teoría y Realidad Constitucional Vol. 37, núm. (2016) numero especial sobre la cuestión catalana

Teoría y Realidad Constitucional Vol. 37, núm. (2016) numero especial sobre la cuestión catalana

full text available at: http://www2.uned.es/dpto-derecho-politico/dpto.htm

From Britain and Ireland to Cyprus : accommodating 'divided islands' in the EU political and legal order

Nikos Skoutaris

In the Brexit referendum of 23 June 2016, England and Wales voted to leave the EU, while Scotland and Northern Ireland voted to remain. Following that, there has been a debate about how it would be possible to achieve the continuing EU presence of the UK constituent nations that do not want to be taken out against their will. This paper explores two pathways for Scotland and Northern Ireland to remain in the EU. The first entails the achievement of Scottish independence and the reunification of Ireland through democratic referendums. To this effect, the paper reviews the right of secession of those two constituent nations under UK constitutional law and revisits the debate on the appropriate legal basis regulating Scotland’s future EU Accession. The second pathway explores how it would be possible for Scotland and Northern Ireland to remain in the EU even without seceding from the UK. In order to do that, the paper points to the remarkable flexibility of the EU legal order to accommodate the differentiated application of Union law. By focusing on Cyprus, in particular, the paper assesses the possible challenges that such an arrangement would entail.

Subject: EU law; Constitutional law; Secession; Territorial differentiation

Full text available at: http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/42484

Brexit: A Drama in Six Acts

Paul P. Craig 

University of Oxford - Faculty of Law

July 11, 2016

European Law Review August 2016 

Abstract:      

Brexit was drama and dramatic in equal measure. The referendum was initially promised in January 23 2013 and took place on June 23 2016. In the intervening years the issue remained largely in the political background, casting the occasional shadow, but rarely if ever dominating debate outside a self-select group of Conservative Eurosceptics. This was unsurprising given that the EU consistently registered low on the issues felt to be important by voters, barely ever coming above seven or eight in this regard. It was also unsurprising even within the Westminster village, since truth to tell it was not clear that the Prime Minister would have to honour the promise. This would only be so if he won an outright victory at the 2015 election. The opinion polls indicated a hung parliament where coalition government would be the order of the day, thereby allowing uncomfortable promises to be kicked into the political long grass. Matters turned out rather differently. David Cameron delivered the outright victory that had not been predicted and basked briefly in the glow of praise that attends such gladiatorial contests. It was to be short lived. The Conservative Eurosceptics left the Prime Minister in no doubt that his promise would indeed have to be kept. They pressed him to name the day, hoping that it would lead not to connubial bliss, but to the break-up of a union. The issue that had simmered on the political back burner assumed centre stage, and the run up to the referendum saw ever more heated debate. The Leave Camp won, and their principal protagonists set a new record for resiling from more promises in a shorter period of time than anyone could recall. Those who favoured Remain sincerely hope that all the rest is not just history.

This article charts the course of Brexit from the Bloomberg speech through to the referendum and beyond. It takes the drama that was Brexit and uses it to structure the subsequent analysis. Being cognizant of place and time, and the fact that it is 400 years since the death of Shakespeare, the ensuing discussion is therefore broken down into six Acts, each of which is foreshadowed by some select Shakespearian quotations that are pertinent to the discourse. I hope that it thereby enriches the analysis. Act 1 considers the road to Bloomberg and the origins of the promise to hold the referendum, followed in Act 2 by examination of the importance of the Balance of Competence Review, which was a major government exercise in which each department assessed the impact of EU law in its area. Act 3 picks up the story after the Conservative electoral victory in 2015, analysing David Cameron’s renegotiation of the UK’s terms of EU membership, while Act 4 concerns the referendum debate and the principal arguments deployed by the Leave and Remain camp respectively. Act 5, entitled the ‘political fall-out, a week is a long time in politics’, continues the story in the aftermath of the referendum, and contains three more specific scenes, politics as blood-sport, politics as party and politics as responsibility; it is followed by Act 6 ‘the legal fall-out, two years is a short time in law’, which also has three particular scenes in which key issues concerning the beginning, middle and end of the negotiation process under Article 50 TEU are explored.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 42

Keywords: EU, withdrawal, Parliament, referendum, prerogative

Full text available at:

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2807975&download=yes

LSE "After the EU Referendum: What Next for Britain and Europe?"

"Presented by the Harold Laski Chair and Professor of Political Science, Simon Hix, this lecture will discuss the political and economic ramifications for Britain and Europe following the EU Referendum results. Professor Simon Hix is one of the leading researchers, teachers, and commentators on EU politics and institutions in the UK. He has published over 100 books and articles on various aspects of EU, European, British and comparative politics. He regularly gives evidence to committees in the UK House of Commons and House of Lords, and in the European Parliament, and he has advised the UK Cabinet Office and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office under both Labour and Conservative administrations" (taken from the LSE youtube channel)

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3p9hxtGltlU

Academy of European Law: Panel Discussion on Brexit and EU Law.

Academy of European Law: Panel Discussion on Brexit and EU Law.
See the video at the following link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-Teo2tXrBPE

In response to a magazine article

Today we had a nice conference in Naples. With regard to this event, today "El Món - El diari lliure, obert i per compartir" published the following article:

http://www.mon.cat/cat/notices/2016/06/diplocat_acusa_l_ambaixada_a_italia_de_pressions_contra_un_acte_del_proces_sobiranista_166018.php

In response to that, I would like to clarify the following point: although it is true that the name of my colleague Josu de Miguel Bárcena was added at a later moment, I would like to emphasize that he is a very well-known expert in the field and gave added value to the debate, as was indeed immediately acknowledged by the organizers. I personally enjoyed his speech very much. I also read with interest his very detailed article on Art. 50 TEU  published in "Revista de estudios políticos" two years ago. In general, all the interventions were scientific and based on sound research. We all had different approaches, but exchanged our views as it is normal in academic life. The organization was great, and I would like to take this opportunity to thank the organizers for their hospitality and kindness

The Dis-United Kingdom

 Lorenzo Zucca

The best still has to come: The United Kingdom will have constitutional headaches for the foreseeable future. Scotland is in pole position: there is no doubt as to its willingness to remain in the EU, but now it is forced to go; when two years ago it voted to remain in the UK, the main argument concerned its relation with the EU. Now, it is ready to negotiate independently with EU leaders. Nicola Sturgeon is the only leader who has a clear idea as to what to do. On the other hand, Brexit leaders are divided and unprepared.

Norther Ireland is also on the brink of a major constitutional crisis. The majority wanted to remain in the EU, and to keep Westminster at arm’s length. The peace is recent and unstable; it is potentially a constitutional moment, in which Northern Ireland reflects on its identity, ties and prospects. A constitutional convention could be a way to appease the turmoil that has been stirred by an unwelcome decision to leave the EU.

Then there is Wales and London. Wales will not sit quietly, when everyone is busy asking for more autonomy and independence. Brexit’s domino effect will be felt in the UK as well as in the rest of Europe. It has already been endorsed as a victory by Catalonian Independence movement, and by the Northern League in Italy. It is a reaction against centralisation of power in London and in Bruxelles. It is a reaction to elites who live in capital cities and rule from their ivory tower.

London is not in sync with the rest of the country. Londoners voted to remain, but they have been outvoted by the rest of England and Wales united. It is not surprising: the rest of England is one of the poorest regions in Europe. The gap between London and the rest is outrageous; but let us be very clear: that has nothing to do with Europe. That has to do with UK domestic policies that wiped away the industrial fabric of the country during the Thatcher years. Little has been done in 40 years to relaunch a stable economic infrastructure in England and Wales. The economic engine was in the City of London: financial success propelled the UK for a couple of decades. But when the crisis hit, the rest of the country suffered enormously.

Eastern Europeans, and Poles in particular, are the scape goats of a situation that was inevitable. The blame is directed to the outsiders, taking jobs away, and wrecking the economy. But the truth is that the blame should be directed to the political leaders, Labour and Conservatives, who allowed the country to become so damningly polarised and economically unbalanced. Brexit leaders have exploited basic anger and hatred: they fed these emotions with an enemy. They told lies about the British Eldorado outside of the EU. The sad truth is that people will wake up soon with the same problems and lesser opportunities.

What is unforgivable is that Brexit leaders are no way near to act upon their promises. They are discussing at the moment the meaning of Brexit: OK, the people want us to leave. But in practice, what the hell does it mean?  Brexit leaders do not know. In fact, we do not even know who will lead the negotiations with the EU. This will take time: a new prime minister has to be selected, and he has to appoint a delegation that will negotiate the terms of the exit. It will take time, but there is no time. The clock is ticking and the people would like to see some results. The EU is also keen to resolve the uncertainty; nobody, in fact, welcome years of uncertainty. Companies, businesses, individuals: we all need to know what is going to happen in the near future, in order to make the best decision for ourselves.

Boris Johnson is now shifting to a much more moderate tone. In essence, he would like to maintain a strong relation with the EU, but without any serious (political) commitment: friends with benefits. You do your business, you make your money and that is the end of the story. Well, that is one story from a viewpoint. What Boris is not saying is that in order to have a strong relation, one has to respect all the rules agreed by the EU without having a say. Also, it means that the fundamental economic freedoms at the core of the market have to be respected: they include freedom of circulation of workers, amongst other things. Being a friend with benefits may sound good on paper, but the practice is often more demanding and complicated.

This will all take a long time. By the time Brexit leaders have agreed about the meaning of Brexit, and have elected a new Prime Minister, and have appointed a delegation to Bruxelles, Scotland might have already reached an agreement in Bruxelles. Norther Ireland might have decided to open a constitutional convention. And Wales will have knocked for more devolution. Those who voted Brexit are now celebrating and singing ‘Rule Britannia’ in the streets. They are still dreaming. When they will wake up, they will have to face the facts: there is no Empire, and Brexit will not solve their economic problems. Immigrants will not be deported, and if foreigners decide to leave, this will not solve their problems either. One day, they will wake up to discover that the Kingdom is Dis-United. 

-- 

Lorenzo Zucca

Professor of Law and Philosophy

King's College London

Strand

London WC2R 2LS

+44 207 8482316