Administrative Law and the Judicial Control of Agents in Authoritarian Regimes
Tom Ginsburg
University of Chicago Law School
THE POLITICS OF COURTS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES, Tom Ginsburg and Tamir Moustafa, eds., Cambridge University Press, 2008
Abstract:
One reason that dictators empower courts is to monitor and discipline lower level administrative agents. This chapter applies a version of the well-known McNollgast framwork to understand the evolution of administrative law in modern China. Administrative law became an attractive solution to principal-agent problems just as ideology was disappearing as an effective tool in the post 1979 period.
One reason that dictators empower courts is to monitor and discipline lower level administrative agents. This chapter applies a version of the well-known McNollgast framwork to understand the evolution of administrative law in modern China. Administrative law became an attractive solution to principal-agent problems just as ideology was disappearing as an effective tool in the post 1979 period.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 26
Keywords: authoritarianism, administrative law, ChinaFull text available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2006538
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