Chevron and Constitutional Doubt
Jonathan D. Urick
University of Virginia School of Law
Forthcoming, Virginia Law Review, Vol. 98, December 2012
Abstract:
Federal agencies regularly swim in murky constitutional waters. Established principles of statutory interpretation, however, leave federal courts adrift amid these dangerous shoals. When faced with agency interpretations that raise constitutional doubts, courts are potentially caught in a bind. On the one hand, the famous rule of Chevron U.S.A. Inc., v. Natural Resources Defense Council instructs courts to defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of its own statute. Cutting against deference, the longstanding canon of constitutional avoidance counsels courts when possible to choose a statutory construction avoiding serious constitutional doubts. Since the Supreme Court’s Chevron opinion offers little guidance on interpretive methodology, the solution to this dilemma is far from clear. Although the Supreme Court has resolved the conflict in favor of the avoidance canon, the Court’s rationale remains somewhat of a mystery. Commentators generally tell a story of policy. This Note offers an alternative account rooted in history and congressional intent.
As this Note seeks to demonstrate, by the time Chevron was decided there was a plausible background understanding that constitutional avoidance displaces judicial deference to administrative statutory interpretation. Further, given its historical foundation, this understanding is especially important because it can potentially be attributed to Congress as an implied limitation on agency discretion to resolve statutory ambiguity. Applying avoidance to displace Chevron would thus follow from the common textualist practice of reading statutes in light of established background conventions. If true, this Note’s historical account establishes a mandatory, rather than merely prudential, limitation on the presumed delegation of interpretive authority behind Chevron deference. Commentators are thus wrong to conclude automatically that all norms and canons grounded in common law must yield to Chevron doctrine. As this Note contends, the interpretive analysis is not nearly so simple. Whatever questions surround a canon’s origins, longstanding court practice is an important yet currently undervalued consideration when resolving the interaction between Chevron and established canons of construction.
Federal agencies regularly swim in murky constitutional waters. Established principles of statutory interpretation, however, leave federal courts adrift amid these dangerous shoals. When faced with agency interpretations that raise constitutional doubts, courts are potentially caught in a bind. On the one hand, the famous rule of Chevron U.S.A. Inc., v. Natural Resources Defense Council instructs courts to defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of its own statute. Cutting against deference, the longstanding canon of constitutional avoidance counsels courts when possible to choose a statutory construction avoiding serious constitutional doubts. Since the Supreme Court’s Chevron opinion offers little guidance on interpretive methodology, the solution to this dilemma is far from clear. Although the Supreme Court has resolved the conflict in favor of the avoidance canon, the Court’s rationale remains somewhat of a mystery. Commentators generally tell a story of policy. This Note offers an alternative account rooted in history and congressional intent.
As this Note seeks to demonstrate, by the time Chevron was decided there was a plausible background understanding that constitutional avoidance displaces judicial deference to administrative statutory interpretation. Further, given its historical foundation, this understanding is especially important because it can potentially be attributed to Congress as an implied limitation on agency discretion to resolve statutory ambiguity. Applying avoidance to displace Chevron would thus follow from the common textualist practice of reading statutes in light of established background conventions. If true, this Note’s historical account establishes a mandatory, rather than merely prudential, limitation on the presumed delegation of interpretive authority behind Chevron deference. Commentators are thus wrong to conclude automatically that all norms and canons grounded in common law must yield to Chevron doctrine. As this Note contends, the interpretive analysis is not nearly so simple. Whatever questions surround a canon’s origins, longstanding court practice is an important yet currently undervalued consideration when resolving the interaction between Chevron and established canons of construction.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 46
Keywords: Legislation, Statutory Interpretation, Textualism, Chevron Deference, Administrative Law, Legal HistoryFull text available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2035906
Nessun commento:
Posta un commento