Constitutional Aspects of the Pluralisation of the EU Executive Through ‘Agencification’
Herwig C.H. Hofmann
Universite du Luxembourg - European Law
Alessandro Morini
affiliation not provided to SSRN
March 30, 2012
University of Luxembourg Law Working Paper No. 2012-01
Abstract:
The Treaty of Lisbon has put emphasis on a more strict separation of executive functions between the EU and the Member States. At the same time it attempts to concentrate more executive powers on the Union level in the hands of the Commission. This article argues that the Treaty of Lisbon’s innovations have some paradoxical effects. In reality they favour the ongoing diversification towards more hybrid and collaborative executive structures. The article discusses, from the point of view of an EU constitutional law, possible explanations and models for understanding and assessing the ongoing delegation of powers.
The Treaty of Lisbon has put emphasis on a more strict separation of executive functions between the EU and the Member States. At the same time it attempts to concentrate more executive powers on the Union level in the hands of the Commission. This article argues that the Treaty of Lisbon’s innovations have some paradoxical effects. In reality they favour the ongoing diversification towards more hybrid and collaborative executive structures. The article discusses, from the point of view of an EU constitutional law, possible explanations and models for understanding and assessing the ongoing delegation of powers.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 41
Full text available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2031499
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